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THE OTHER GoVERNMEN'J". By Mark J. Green. New York: 
Viking Press. 1975. Pp. xii, 318. $12.50 
I. THE GREENING OF AMERIKA 
As Karl Rossmann, a poor boy of sixteen who had been packed off to 
America by his parents . . . stood on the liner slowly entering the 
harbour of New York, a sudden burst of sunshine seemed to illu-
mine the Statue of Liberty, so that he saw it in a new light, although 
he had sighted it long before. The arm with the sword rose up as if 
newly stretched aloft .... 
F. KAFKA, Amerika 3 (1938) 
The Other Government is about the power Washington lawyers 
wield over the government of the United States. Author Mark Green 
sets the scene for us: 
As the Washington, D.C., Tourline bus creeps along Rock Creek 
Parkway, the guide diligently points out the Lincoln and Jefferson 
memorials, . . . Congress, the Supreme Court, the White House. 
But a bus guide knowledgeable in the reality rather than the formal-
ity of Washington could have taken bis visitors by the other govern-
ment-those thirty-five large law firms, of more than twenty attor-
neys each, which practice powerlaw. [P. 3.] 
This is a particularly felicitous beginning for The Other Government. 
The Tourline bus company is fictional, and none of the many Wash-
ington tour bus companies has a route that follows Rock Creek Park-
way.1 In short, Mark Green's Washington could be the capital city 
of Franz Kafka's Amerika. Each book, in its own way, raises genu-
ine and difficult questions about the human condition. But, in the 
course of dealing with these questions, each subtly shifts the relation-
ship between truth and fantasy, the real and the unreal. 
The Other Government in essence raises two questions. First, 
do ethical principles require a lawyer to temper zeal for his client's 
interest with concern for the public good? And, second, do lawyers 
practicing in the national capital have any special responsibilities to 
the public interest? These are hardly novel questions, and they can-
1. Commercial vehicles or common carriers are prohibited by regulation from op-
erating on roadways in the National Capital Parks except by order of the Superin• 
tendent of National Capital Parks. 36 C.F.R. § 50.36(a) (1975). 
148 
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not be properly elucidated here. But brief consideration of the 
questions may help in analyzing how Green handles them. 
A response to the first question is found in the official posture 
of the American Bar Association:2 that a lawyer is not a mere instru-
mentality of his client's interests but is, above all, the guardian of 
our law and democratic principles. While this high-toned idea may 
·not have an objective correlative in the day-to-day practice of most 
lawyers, it at least articulates a norm that most lawyers accept: the 
obligation to the client is secondary to the obligation to society. But 
is there a conflict between this principle and the lawyer's chief func-
tion in our society, zealously to represent the interests of his client 
within the bounds of law? 
There is, I think, no real conflict between these principles. Our 
legal system presupposes a process dominated not by interested par-
ties but by a disinterested decision maker who is free and competent 
to decide between opposing contentions. It is the existence of this 
neutral decision maker that harmonizes the potential dissonance be-
tween the interests of the client and the interests of society. But 
this proposition, of course, has a corollary: If the decision maker is 
incompetent or corrupt, the lawyer's moral role is drastically differ-
ent. An essential but unspoken assumption of The Other Govern-
ment is that the corollary fits the facts. But the proof Green tenders 
on the subject tells the opposite tale. 3 
The second major question raised by The Other Government is 
whether Washington lawyers should be subject to any distinctive eth-
ical considerations. I think the answer is clearly yes. If the Wash-
ington lawyer is involved with business decisions of large clients, if 
his work may affect many people and many interests, obviously his 
ethical considerations are broader than those of a lawyer whose work 
touches few. Likewise, the legislative and quasi-legislative proc-
esses-areas in which Washington counsel are often helpful to cli-
ents-may present ethical concerns that differ from those raised in 
the course of civil litigation. While litigation archetypically involves 
what has already occurred and touches only the parties before the 
court, legislation theoretically is forward-looking and is generally 
binding. To the extent that real cases resemble the archetypes, the 
Washington practitioner's ethical concerns should be atypically 
broad. 
The principles, as usual, are clear enough; few are likely to 
quarrel with the utilitarian postulate that no lawyer can properly rep-
resent a client if the lawyer calculates that the social cost of that rep-
resentation will outweigh the social benefit. The hard part is apply-
2. ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, preamble. 
3. -See text at notes 7-14 infra. 
150 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:148 
ing this principle to the facts. 4 Lawyers may disagree on how the 
calculation comes out in a given case depending on (1) differing 
perceptions about the merits of the case; (2) differences in various 
lawyers' need for money, work, or other epiphenomena of repre-
senting clients; and (3) perceptions about the social value of allow-
ing an individual to hire a lawyer to represent him, or, stated another 
way, the social cost of a legal system in which a lawyer functions 
as advocate of his client's cause rather than as society's ombudsman. 
The factual thesis of The Other Government is simple: that 
"Washington lawyers are among the most powerful people in the 
country t<>4ay" (p. 4); that they are "earthshakers and lawmakers" 
(p. 9), a shadow government of lawlords (p. 15) who function, not 
merely as conventional advocates, but as decision makers in their 
own right, actually giving orders to agency bureaucrats (p. 9). The 
work of these lawyers is based on "ten commandments": reputa-
tion, brains, information, interlocking interests, preferential access, 
lobbying, law-writing, inundation, delay, and corruption (pp. 12-
15). These skills, says Green, are especially the tools of the famous 
law firm of Covington and Burling, and of my former associate Lloyd 
Cutler.11 An examination of Green's own tale of their exploits, how-
ever, shows how tenuous is the ground upon which the thesis rests. 0 
Manifestations of Covington and Burling power-lawyering do not 
appear until page seventy-five, but then several are mentioned seria-
tim. It is first retold how in 1956 Gerhard Gesell, then the firm's 
premier antitrust litigator, successfully defended du Pont in Sherman 
Act litigation that went to the Supreme Court (pp. 75-76).7 The 
essential question, as Green explains it, was whether there existed 
any economic substitutes for cellophane. Gesell convinced the 
Court that foil, glassine, and other packing materials did compete 
with cellophane. Score one for the lawlords. But there follows im-
mediately a curious passage (p. 76) that I find difficult to reconcile 
with the putative theme of the book: "Gov.ernment lawyers were 
aghast at the decision. But the Covington team . . . had won what 
was to be, until the 1970's, the last major antitrust victory of a private 
4. See J. FRANK, CoURTS ON ThIAL 14-15 (1949). 
5. It would be more usual in law firm parlance to say that I was Cutler's associ-
ate and be my employer, but if associateness is not a reciprocal relationship, what 
fun is it? It is important to stress this connection with Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering 
at the outset, so that the reader can evaluate my criticisms of The Other Government 
with this possible source of bias in mind. 
6. I have been content, for the most part, to rely on the facts as Green gives 
them; I do not mean, by repeating them, to warrant their accuracy. On the con-
trary, the book is filled with mistakes large and small, and I do not doubt that the 
facts I did not check are as snarled as tte ones I did. Some of the latter I note 
through the body of this review. 
7. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 ( 1956). 
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corporation against the government in the Supreme Court."8 If 
Gesell in fact never won another major antitrust case in the Su-
preme Court9 one would suppose an explanation to be in order. Had 
Gesell lost his touch? 
The next bit of "evidence" also involves du Pont, this time rep-
resented by Covington's Hugh Cox. The government sought to 
force a divestiture of du Pont's approximately $3 billion worth of 
General Motors stock and at length succeeded (pp. 77-79). "Cox 
had lost his biggest case," Green tells us (p. 79). 
Further evidence of the lawlords' mighty sway is found in Cov-
ington's representation of General Electric in the electrical industry 
price-fixing conspiracy trial (pp. 80-83). Gesell pleaded his client 
guilty and fines totalling $400,000 were levied. Several executives 
of the corporation served thirty-day jail terms, an extremely rare oc-
currence in antitrust prosecutions. "Eight years passed before an-
other American businessman went to jail for antitrust crime," Green 
solemnly relates, "and again a Covington lawyer was involved, 
deeply involved" (p. 83). 
Then, "[i]n 1967 and 1968, the federal government brought 
seven antitrust cases against [ITTs baking subsidiary], three crimi-
nal and four civil; the government won all seven'' (p. 88). Green 
sums up: "Whatever Covington's role in these Justice Department 
cases, no one can doubt their significance" (p. 96). I, for one, do 
not doubt their significance. What they signify is that Covington and 
Burling's much-vaunted "power'' does not appear to include the 
power to manipulate the outcomes of important cases. Virtually all 
the evidence Green tenders on this subject shows that the "earth-
shaker-lawmaker" picture lacks verisimilitude. 
Lloyd Cutler fares little better in Green's hands. Cutler appears 
to hold a strange fascination for Green, who compares him to Mao 
Tse-tung (p. 55) but leaves it open whether Cutler is an "evil gen-
ius" (p. 169)10 or a "guiding genius" (p. 252).11 Green gives Cut-
8. Whether this assertion is true, I suppose, turns on what you think a major case 
is. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy P•rods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); FfC 
v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958); FfC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 
396 (1958). 
9. Gesell was appointed judge of the District Court for the District of Columbia 
in 1967. I have no idea what Gesell's box score was between 1956 and 1967. See 
note 6 supra. 
10. Deadpans Green: "Not surprisingly, Cutler is sensitive to such criticisms" (p. 
169). 
11. Green's Cutler is definitely, however, "hardworking and hustling'' (p. 49), 
even to the point, we are told, of a bit of discreet self-promotion. In connection 
with the American Airlines campaign contribution scandal, for example, Cutler re-
portedly advised the airline, his client, to "come clean," and as part of his strategy 
spread the word of American's confession through the news media. According to 
Green, "Cutler called Washington Post executive editor Benjamin Bradlee to elabo-
rate on American's admission and his own role in the episode. Bradlee thought this 
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ler credit for a "polished demeanor" (p. 61) and bushy eyebrows 
(p. 58). But does Cutler lawmake and earthshake? Can Cutler 
part the waters of bureaucracy so that his rich clients might cross 
on dry land? As with Covington, the proof fails to meaure up to 
the pleading. For example, Cutler participated on behalf of CBS 
in the FCC's hearings on the so-called fifty-fifty rule, proposed to 
prohibit networks from supplying their affiliates with more than fifty 
percent of regularly scheduled prime time series programming (pp. 
223-24). Cutler argued, Green tells us, that there were not enough 
sponsors willing to assume the risk of underwriting non-network 
shows and that CBS was supplying the public with the programming 
they wanted anyway. But the Commission nevertheless went ahead 
with a version of the fifty-fifty rule, now called the prime time access 
rule, which prevents the networks from programming one of the four 
prime time hours nightly.12 An individual's perception about 
whether this rule is in the public interest will almost certainly turn 
on whether he likes the game shows that have largely filled the void 
that the networks have been obliged to leave in the. evening sched-
ule. is 
Green tenders another example of Cutler's extraordinary influ-
ence: the 1970 merger plans of American and Western Airlines 
excessive self-promotion, but the Post story did laud" American's candor in the inci-
dent (p. 48). Curious about how Green could tell what Bradlee thinks, I called the 
Washington Post for clarification. I read Bradlee the entire paragraph in which the 
excerpted sentence appeared and asked him: "How does Mark Green know what you 
think?" "Beats the shit out of me," he explained. Elaborating, Bradlee told me that 
he remembers having a conversation with Green but denies the thought about Cutler 
that Green attributes to him. Telephone conversation, July 23, 1915. 
To illustrate the unusual services Cutler can supply to his clients, Green writes: 
"After Cutler spoke to his friend James Reston about corporate contributions, Reston 
produced a Times column urging firms which had made illegal gifts to admit their 
guilt" (p. 48). Since the implication is clear that Cutler can induce Reston to write 
columns favorable to Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering clients, I called the Washington 
bureau of the New York Times for confirmation. Reston was indignant at the sugges-
tion that Cutler or anyone else could cause him to . produce a column. "It's a 
calumny on Cutler, really," Reston told me, and added, "I've known him for 2S years, 
and never once has he suggested to me what I should write in a column." Telephone 
conversation, Aug. 11, 1915. 
12. 47 C.F.R. § 73.6S8(k) (1974). 
13. Surveys consistently show that Americans do enjoy watching television. See 
generally R. BOWER, TELEVISION AND THE Ptrauc ( 1973). 
The prime time access rule will probably be with us for a long time to come. 
See National Assn. of Independent Television Producers & Directors v. FCC, S16 
F.2d S26 (2d Cir. 1975); National Assn. of Independent Television Producers & Di-
rectors v. FCC, S02 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1974); Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 
442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971 ). The ostensible purpose of the rule is to promote di-
versity but, in essence, it is simply a welfare benefit for the producers of game shows, 
who would otherwise have insurmountable difficulties in competing with the produc-
ers of regular prime time fare. The entire subject, together with an explanation of 
why the prime time access rule will never work, is discussed with exceptional wit 
and learning (if I do say so myself) in Second Report and Order in Docket No. 
19622, SO FCC 2d 829, 889 (1975) (Robinson, Commr., dissenting). 
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(pp. 200-06). To secure this result, says Green, Cutler and his 
client "launched a lobbying campaign impressive even for the well-
traveled corridors of Washington agencies" (p. 201). They visited 
with four of the five members of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the 
head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, officials in the 
White House and the Department of Transportation, and Treas-
ury Secretary Connally; their "drumfire succeeded in inspiring trans-
portation summitry" (p. 204). The Antitrust Division opposed the 
merger, however, and in the subsequent face-off between the gov-
ernment and The Other Government, the former, as usual, pre-
vailed. 
These tales of lost lawsuits and disappointed hopes are not meant 
to imply that Washington lawyers do not deliver a worthwhile service 
to their clients. I intend only to suggest that they cannot deliver 
particular results unless they can persuade The Original Government 
-the one I work for-to see things their clients' way. This persua-
sion, in my experience, has essentially involved straight lawyering 
-reasoned argument, on the merits, with the relevant private inter-
ests fully disclosed. Green's own showing decisively points to the 
conclusion that The Original Government is quite up to its task of 
refereeing the revenue-producing activities of business. In short, 
The Other Government appears to confirm the assumption that there 
exists a disinterested decision maker that is free and competent to 
choose the public interest from among opposing contentions. The 
verification of this assumption, in tum, has an important bearing on 
the morality of representing a client with whose views the lawyer 
does not necessarily agree.14 
II. OF PEANUT BUTTER, INSANITY, AIRBAGS, 
AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST 
The chief intellectual shortcoming of The Other Government is 
its many facile assumptions about the public interest. Green ap-
pears to believe that good and evil go around unmasked, equally ob-
vious to all, and that only greed and perversity can explain differ-
ences among people about the identity of each. But most practicing 
lawyers find themselves at work in a far more complex world. 
14. I strongly suspect that Green and many other members of the bar overrate 
the efficacy of Washington counsel in influencing policy. Many Washington firms, 
it is true, have talented and energetic people working for them; but agencies also have 
such people, and the agency people, in the last analysis, are the ones who have the 
say about how things are going to be. In many cases, lawyers or lobbyists give the 
illusion of influence by making personal contacts with government officials that any 
half-resourceful person could easily arrange for himself. How and whether such per-
sonal contacts affect policy formation is another question, and one that doubtless 
has a great many different answers. However, after a year's personal experience in 
government, I am deeply skeptical of claims that the special access and charisma of 
super-lawyers exert much influence on government policy. The boring truth seems 
to be that for the most part policy is generated by staff bureaucrats. 
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Safe cars and safe drugs, for example, are undeniable goods, but 
the question is never presented whether, ceteris paribus, society 
would rather have safe drugs and cars or unsafe drugs and cars. The 
question is always how much each attainable increment of safety is 
going to cost. The cost of producing an automobile or a drug that 
could not injure a human being would be so high that no one would 
be able to get any benefit from either.is Whether one believes that 
an increment of benefit is worth the cost · increment is a value 
choice about which people may differ. Society therefore needs po-
litical institutions designed to mediate differences between people 
in particular cases. The lawyer's special province is to administer 
one of the more important of these mediating institutions-the judi-
cial system. But one of the necessary conditions of this trusteeship 
is a degree of professional detachment about which substantive poli-
cies shall be adopted in any given case. If lawyers are not prepared 
to tolerate institutions that are capable of generating policy results 
to which they cannot personally subscribe, then lawyers become 
priests and the law a sort of theology that exalts the correctness of 
substantive outcomes over fair procedures for reaching them. 
There is nothing absurd about the lawyer-as-priest. Theocra-
cies, in one form or another, have probably been the dominant form 
of government since civilization began. But intolerance of substan-
tive policies fairly arrived at, just because they are contrary to one's 
own view, is inconsistent with democratic theory and is, more often 
than not, based on some doubtful assumptions about the nature of 
the public interest. The public interest simply does not occur in the 
wild, sub specie aeternitatis, independent of anyone's values. 
The fugitive character of the public interest is illustrated by one 
of the examples Green uses for just the opposite purpose-the peanut 
butter rule-making, in which Covington and Burling participated at 
great and laborious length (pp. 132-40). When, in 1959, the Food 
and Drug Administration considered what recipe should be prescribed 
in the peanut butter food standard, 16 it had no access to the Platonic 
Caves wherein the Idea of Peanut Butterness is kept. Green, one 
gathers from the book, practically lives in the Platonic Caves and 
could probably tell you right offhand the maximum percentage of 
partially hardened vegetable oil that may be added to ground peanuts 
before the concoction stops being peanut butter and starts being some-
thing else (p. 133-34).17 But the FDA was required to make its deter-
15. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE CosTS OF ACCIDENTS 17-20 (1970). 
16. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1970), provides: "Whenever in the judgment of the [FDA] 
such action will promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers, [it] 
shall promulgate regulations fixing and establishing for any food, under its common 
or usual name so far as practical, a reasonable definition and standard of identity. ,, 
17. One bit of information that is evidently not kept in the caves is the distinction 
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mination on the basis of record evidence compiled at a hearing. That 
this was no easy task can be illustrated by an experiment. Pulverize 
two cups of peanuts in a blender; the result will be a thick, syrupy 
substance like that sold in some stores as "old fashioned peanut but-
ter." It is a good, inexpensive substitute for tahini paste if you are 
making hommos, 18 but it tastes chalky and coats the inside of your 
mouth like tar. In order to make a product that most people will 
find acceptable as peanut butter, some hydrogenated vegetable oil 
must be added. Green implies that the industry had only one goal: 
getting FDA permission to use the smallest possible proportion of 
peanuts to the cheaper vegetable oil. 
Assuming that peanut butter manufacturers are profit maxi-
mizers, it is questionable whether it is in their best interest con-
stantly to cheapen the product without lowering the price. While 
each manufacturer will cut costs all it can, its highest priority will be 
to increase its market share. This, in turn, will require that the 
product be formulated with continuing reference to consumer tastes. 
In a relatively competitive line of commerce like peanut butter, a 
maximum-flexibility standard would allow for widely different peanut 
butters, and the preferences of consumers, rather than the authorita-
tive pronouncement of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, would 
decide which was the "real" peanut butter and which were either 
(1) too much like tan Crisco, or (2) too much like tahini paste. 
I do not know that the FDA standard does not, in fa~t, allow 
for sufficient variation in the product to make such competition feas-
ible. But I have a suspicion, based on three years' experience as 
a group worker with children, that it does not. At least half of my 
former charges preferred butter or margarine on their peanut butter 
sandwiches. Putting margarine on peanut butter sandwiches has the 
same effect as increasing the percentage of vegetable oil in the peanut 
butter. Yet manufacturers that want to sell a product more nearly 
in accord with the tastes of these consumers must sell it as "peanut 
spread" or "imitation peanut butter." Either of these nomenclatures 
might present a difficult obstacle to the marketing of a new prod-
uct, 19 and, as a result, many consumers must do without a peanut 
between vegetable oil and lard. The latter is the rendered fat of animals, especially 
swine. Vegetable oil is not lard. See J. RoMBAUER & M. RoMBAUER, Joy OF CooK-
ING 510 (2d ed. 1964). Compare, however, Green's assertion to the contrary on p. 
134. 
18. Hommos (sometimes spelled "hummus") is made by homogenizing chick 
peas, lemon juice, sesame paste (talzini or tahina) and a couple of tablespoons of 
olive oil with garlic. 
19. We shall see. About a year-and-a-half ago, Kraftco Corporation introduced 
a nonstandard product called Koogle, which is sold as "peanut spread." It cannot 
be sold as peanut butter because it has flavoring added-chocolate, vanilla, cinna-
mon, and banana. According to Dr. J.B. Stein of the Kraft Foods Division of 
Kraftco, with whom I spoke on Aug. 4, 1975, the amount of fat in Koogle does not 
exceed that allowed in the peanut butter standard. Whether Koogle will survive in 
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spread they can enjoy without doctoring it with margarine. The 
great food processing conglomerates, of course, lose little: they 
make margarine as well as peanut butter. 
Even where the public interest seems clear at one time, later 
events may show it is not so. One of the greatest public interest tri-
umphs of the young Abe Fortas was persuading the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1954 to 
adopt the Durham rule for insanity-that a person is not responsible 
for criminal misconduct that is the product of a "mental disease or 
mental defect."20 At the time, it was widely considered a progres-
sive, forward-looking rule. 21 But almost immediately, problems be-
gan to arise. What is a "mental disease or defect" for the purposes 
of the test?22 What connection between the mental illness and the 
criminal act is necessary in order to characterize the latter as the 
"product" of the former?23 How can psychiatrists be permitted to 
testify on these matters without foreclosing the very issue the jury 
is supposed to decide?24 Finally, in 1972, the D.C. Circuit scrapped 
Durham for the American Law Institute's definition of insanity. 20 
Fortas probably never undertook a matter for a paying client that 
the marketplace remains to be seen. The FDA has recently announced plans to "es• 
tablish a common or usual name for spreadable peanut products that fail to meet the 
standard of identity for peanut butter." 40 Fed. Reg. 51,052 (1975). 
20. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
21. See, e.g., deGrazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHI, L REV. 339 
(1955); Roche, Criminality and Mental Illness-Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22 
U. CHI. L. REv. 320 (1955). 
22. See Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957); McDonald v. 
United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
23. See Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957). One senses a 
court near despair in the following passage: 
When we say that the defense of insanity requires that the act be a "product 
or• a disease, we mean that the facts on the record are such that the trier of 
the facts is enabled to draw a reasonable inference that the accused would not 
have committed the act he did commit if he had not been diseased as he was. 
There must be a relationship between the disease and the act, and that relation-
ship, whatever it may be in degree, must be, as we have already said, critical 
in its effect in respect to the act. By "critical" we mean decisive, determinative, 
causal; we mean to convey the idea inherent in the phrases "because of," "except 
for," "without which," "but for," "effect of," "result of," "causative factor." 
252 F.2d at 617. 
24. See Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 862-64 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, 
J., concurring); Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See 
also United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J., 
concurring). In 1961, then Circuit Judge Burger wrote: "[IJn the short span since 
1954 this court has written some 70 opinions growing directly out of the 'disease-
product' test. In large part . . . the inordinate number of appeals and appellate opin-
ions in this jurisdiction stems from the vagueness, lack of clarity, and the psychiatric 
orientation of that test and from its departure from accepted legal concepts in the 
juzy instruction." Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961) 
(Burger, J., concurring). 
25. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Brawner re• 
counts the histozy of the insanity defense in the Circuit since Durham. 
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produced more unfortunate results. Durham was an unmitigated 
disaster for the courts and probably never eased the plight of a single 
insane person in the District of Columbia through its seventeen years 
of life. But that is precisely the point about good and evil: it is 
often terribly hard to tell them apart ahead of time. While careful 
reflection on the policy options and competing concerns may not im-
prove outcomes in every case, it "Seems prudent to behave as if it 
would. Such reflection is best promoted by the adversary process, 
which in tum suggests that a party should not have to win his case 
before he can get a lawyer. 
In other situations the alternatives and concerns are not hidden, 
but the morally "right" result may.nevertheless be difficult to reach. 
Green discusses the "air bag" matter (pp. 183-85), for example, 
which, though he does not recognize it, involves competition be-
tween incommensurable values. In 1972, Ford Motor Company and 
several other automobile manufacturers went to court to overturn 
standard 208 of the National Highway Traffic Administration 
(NHTA).26 This standard required that automobiles, beginning 
with the 1974 model year, be equipped with passive occupant-re-
straint devices with specified performance characteristics.27 As a 
practical matter, this standard required crash-inflated airbags. Ac-
cording to Green (p. 183), "The idea is that when a car stops dead, 
the passengers won't."28 John H. Pickering, Lloyd Cutler's partner, 
argued on behalf of Ford that, among other things, the standard's 
performance specifications were not sufficiently objective to allow 
compliance because of defects in NHTA's own testing procedures. 
Green saw this as "a typical public interest-private interest battle" 
(p. 184) in which there was no doubt where the public interest lay: 
he claimed that any delay in instituting the air bag standard 
would cause "thousands of people . . . needlessly [to] die" (p. 
185). But the court saw it differently: 
The importance of objectivity in safety standards cannot be overem-
phasized. The Act puts the burden on the manufacturer to assure 
that his vehicles comply under pain of substantial penalties. In the 
absence of objectively defined performance requirements and test 
procedures, a manufacturer has no assurance that his own test results 
will be duplicated in tests conducted by the Agency. Accordingly, 
such objective criteria are absolutely uecessary so that "the question 
of whether there is compliance with the standard can be answered by 
26. Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 663 (6th Cir. 1972). 
27. 472 F.2d at 664. 
28. When I read that sentence, I thought that I would at least have to give Green 
credit for having turned a clever phra'i;e. Then I read the opinion of Peck, J., in 
Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 663 (6th Cir. 1972), where 
the following explanation of occupant-restraint devices appears: "The idea is to as-
sure that when the car stops dead, the passengers don't." 
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objective measurement and without recourse to any subjective deter-
mination. "29 
What is the "right" result? On the one hand is the contention 
that manufacturers' resistance to the use of air bags will cause the 
loss of many lives. The competing contention is that the conduct 
supposedly required by the rule has not been declared with the clar-
ity demanded by what Professor Fuller calls the "inner morality 
of law."30 Partisanship aside, 31 it seems to me that the issue is one 
of genuine difficulty. Green, ironically, is correct in calling this 
case "typical":32 the court's conclusion is typical of what one would 
expect where a high value is placed on regularity of government ac-
tion. A similar question is before an appellate court every time a 
convicted defendant asks for a retrial because crucial evidence was 
unreasonably seized or the jury was improperly instructed. In such 
cases, we pretermit (or everu assume) the substantive correctness 
of the result and ask whether the process was fair. 
ill. THE BROWNING OF THE PuBLIC 1NTEREST33 
Would you have your songs endure? 
Build on the human heart. 
R. Browning, Sordel/o (1840) 
The failures of The Other Government are not limited to intel-
lectual ones. It also suffers from failures of the heart, and these 
are by far its most serious flaws. First, there is a studied evasiveness 
about the prose as though Green were somehow ambivalent about 
standing behind many of the tl:hings he wishes us to understand: "To 
admirers, [John W.] Davis's soaring response remains the classic 
explanation of the lawyer's role. But others wonder exactly what 
29. Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 675 (6th Cir. 1972). 
30. L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 42 (1964). 
31. This case was argued and decided when I was a Wilmer, Cutler, and Pickering 
associate. I suppose that makes me an ex officio partisan, although I had nothing 
to do with the case. 
32. As always, Green's analysis of the problem is contemptuous and cavalier: 
"What is good enough for GM engineering should be good enough for Cutler. But 
he supported instead a client (Ford) who didn't believe in air bags, even though his 
other client (GM) did. As Lloyd Cutler once said with firmness in an interview, 
he believes in ·the arguments he makes" (p. 185). I cannot understand why Lloyd 
Cotler ought to be bound by what GM engineers think, although if Green would 
agree to be bound by the same criterion I should not wonder if a deal of some sort 
could be worked out. In the meantime, however, it is silly to suggest that Cutler 
is guilty of hypocrisy because his firm's clients do not all have identical interests. 
No issue of professional ethics arises where full disclosure is made to clients with 
potentially conflicting interests and their assent to their lawyer's proposed representa-
tion is obtained. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILllY, DR 5-105. I 
leave to one side whether it is correct to treat Piokering as merely Cutler's alter ego. 
33. This pun is borrowed from Professor Philip B. Kurland's address to the Mi11-
nesota Law Review dinner in May of 1971. 
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philosophy it was that required Davis to devote his professional life to 
the House of Morgan" (pp. 268-69) . "To his admirers, [Cutler] 
is the model of the modern lawyer, but his critics would sentence 
him to the eclectic chair" (p. 45). Peter Hutt's "food lawyering, 
his pro bono work, his boyish looks and disarming openness made 
him a [Covington] wunderkind," but when he became chief coun-
sel for FDA and refused to publish the firm's client list, he "greatly 
upset public-interest lawyer Anita Johnson, who wondered how the 
public could tell whether Hutt should take himself off future cases." 
(pp. 30-31). This technique might be called the Nixon euphuism: 
criticisms are advanced ex nihilo or by third persons and seldom 
supported with reasons. The Nixon euphuism gives an author "plaus-
ible deniability" for the things that he writes and frustrates reasoned 
debate. It is a technique best avoided. 
Another failure of the heart is reflected in the incoherence of 
the book's organization; it suggests an unsettling contempt for the 
whole undertaking. Despite the author's assurance that the book 
had a gestation period of five years (p. vii), there is strong textual 
evidence that The Other Government was rushed into print.34 Nor 
is the evidence of perfunctory craftsmanship formal only. Substan-
tively, The Other Government wanders around in a wilderness of 
trivia, confusion, and malice. For example, as chapter one ends we 
are still awaiting evidence that Washington lawyers are "earthshak-
ers and lawmakers." But chapter two has quite a different purpose 
-anthropology. Its mission is to show that Covington and Burling 
is "a culture as well as a law firm" (p. 31). But this is curious 
anthropology; rather, it is an odd ragbag of facts, nonfacts, gossip, 
and opinions. Thus, we start with the assertion that the firm is the 
city's most influential-the Everest of Washington practice (pp. 16-
24). Next is a short historical sketch, beginning with the firm's ori-
gins during the Wilson Administration (pp. 20-25) and ending with 
the assertion that the firm is "very much an institution in flux" (p. 
25). Following this assertion are biographies of three firm lawyers, 
Dean Acheson, H. Thomas Austern, and Peter B. Hutt (pp. 25-
31), that appear to illustrate just the opposite point.35 There fol-
34. In addition to many apparent proofing errors, see, e.g., pp. 37 note, 138, 166, 
are assorted giddy howlers like: "[Washington lawyers] are to all lawyers and citi-
zens what the heart is to the body: by dint of central location and essential function, 
both are the reigning organs of their respective body politic" (p. 4) and "Is [pro bono 
work] built into the law firm's structure or merely random events?" (p. 244). Such 
defects, to my mind, are autoptical proof of insouciance at least. 
35. From Acheson to Austem to Hutt, the firm has shown a consistent preference 
for graduates of the Harvard Law School who have stamina, brains, and a taste for 
representing business corporations. 
Green does eventually get around to proffering some evidence of Covington in 
flux; he says the firm's representation of airline clients has dropped off in recent 
years (p. 200). I cannot say whether this is true or not. See note 6 supra. 
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lows the fact that the firm has a large support staff (p. 37) and the 
nonfact that associates are expected to bill eighty hours every two 
weeks (p. 38), We are also given some soft-core gossip: certain 
Covington lawyers have known drinking problems (p. 31), and a 
lawyer there was discovered one Saturday morning rolling on the of-
fice floor with his secretary (pp. 31-32). Finally, we come to a pas-
sage tinted with the sunset, which suggests that Covington may, in 
fact, be over the hill: "Great institutions come, peak and decline, 
from the British East India Trade Company to Life magazine to the 
New York Yankees, and it is only in retrospect that we learn that 
moment in time when events conspired to undo institutional inevit-
ability" (p. 44). 
Well, which is it to be? Tenzings on the Everest of powerlaw, 
or the Yankees on their way to the cellar? Since both propositions are 
expounded and neither is anywhere illustrated, it presumably does 
not matter. Although both assertions could be false, they could not 
both be true. 
Another failure of the heart-this, I think, the most objection-
able of all-is found in Green's positive tropism toward malicious 
innuendo. Take, for example, what Green calls "the Fazzano epi-
sode." "Exactly who is Joseph Fazzano?" asks Green (p. 89). Un-
fortunately, The Other Government never answers this question, al-
though it is clear that Green sees a menacing aura round him. All 
we are told about Fazzano is that he is a Hartford lawyer who was 
hired by ITT, apparently for the purpose of representing IITs inter-
est before the Connecticut Insurance Commission, when the con-
glomerate was attempting to acquire the Hartford Fire Insurance 
Company. ITT had also retained Covington as well as a large Hart-
ford law firm in connection with this acquisition. Henry Sailer, a 
Covington lawyer on the case, did not know who Fazzano was (pp. 
89-90). Does this suggest the existence of impropriety? To me, 
it suggests nothing at all; yet by the time we .get to the last chapter, 
Fazzano's name is inexplicably linked with Dita Beard and the over-
throw of the Allende government in Chile as evidence of ITI's bad 
character, and Covington's (p. 273). 
And then there are times where innuendo gives way to outright 
accusations of personally and professionally disgraceful behavior. 
Did you know, for example, that a certain Covington partnev-
Green names him, though I shall not-"does not particularly like 
black people"? This, according to Green, is "obvious to fellow law-
yers" (p. 199). Or did you know that another (unnamed) Coving-
ton lawyer destroyed unidentified evidence of a client's criminal con-
duct (p. 70)? And how about H. Thomas Austern's unethical be-
havior in citing precedents to government officials? At least four 
times Austern is in effect called a knave, a bully, or worse for this 
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offense.36 And what of the "ex parte" contacts Washington counsel 
so frequently have with public officials? Well-what about them? 
In his dark references to private (p. 201) or "ex parte" (p. 202) 
meetings between businessmen or their lawyers and government of-
ficials, Green muddles the distinction between contacts that are for-
bidden by agency rules and those that are not and leaves the reader 
who does not know better with a sinister, and inaccurate, impression. 
Administrative agencies, whether inside the executive branch or in-
dependent, are not courts and are not supposed to conduct their busi-
ness in an ivory tower, aloof from the teeming and intricate com-
merce they were established to regulate. On the contrary, agencies 
have a special expertise in the matters under their superintendence 
and do not, as a rule, go to pieces when people in the regulated in-
dustries seek to express their desires. Bureaucrats find many such 
meetings useful and constructive and are at least as available to 
members of the general public, including self-styled representatives 
of the public interest, as to businessmen and their lawyers. 
IV. THE ETHICS OF POWERLAW AND THE 
ETHICS OF DECENCY 
Certitude is not the test of certainty. We have been cock-sure of 
many things that were not so. 
Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1918) 
In connection with its various difficulties in advertising its prod-
ucts, the tobacco industry hired Covington and Burling's Austem and 
a former Senator named Earle Clements. According to The Other 
Government, Clements was to specialize in communications with 
Congress, while Austern was to handle other matters. To Green 
"this raises the difficult issue of whether lawyers can or should ethi-
cally compartmentalize their advocacy, and not assume responsibility· 
for client advocacy from which they are carefully insulated. In-
volved is a contradiction of cliches: Does the right hand not know 
what the left hand is doing? Or does one hand wash the other?" 
(pp. 152-53). 
I leave it to the reader to sort out the meaning of this medita-
tion, and mention only that it typifies the clarity of Green's thinking 
on legal ethics. The last chapter of The Other Government is enti-
tled "The Ethics of Powerlaw," and its burden is to propose "a new 
lawyers' ethic": that a lawyer ought in every case to "make a judg-
ment about the likely impact [of his representation] on the public, 
and if the client desires tactics based on political influence or seeks 
a demonstrable though avoidable public harm, he should quit the ac-
count" (p. 287; italics omitted). Green quotes a Wilmer, Cutler, 
36. See p. 135 (knave); pp. 97, 273 (bully); p. 145 (worse). 
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and Pickering recruiting memorandum that expresses the same 
thought: "We decline to represent clients whose objectives or tac-
tics we find unacceptable, or who ask us to represent a position on 
any basis other than its merits" (p. 282). Both of these statements 
accord with the utilitarian calculus laid down as a truism at the be-
ginning of this book review.37 
It is a comfort to know that there is at least one thing about 
which both Cutler and Green can agree, even if it is only a truism. 
Unfortunately, as Green recognizes (pp. 287-88), this truism leaves 
intact all the problems. Where Green and many other lawyers-
1, for one-would disagree most radically is on the value to be as-
signed to giving even a bad client the benefit of process before de-
ciding what should be done with him. We see the existence of proc-
ess as so important to the idea of justice, both in a theoretical and 
in a practical sense, that we are even willing to tolerate injustice in 
particular cases in order to maintain the integrity of governmental 
processes over the long pull. For Green, however, the axis of deci-
sion is always substantive right and wrong; his conception of right 
is usually vivid and seldom alloyed by doubt. Accordingly, the 
whole idea of regular process seems senseless to him. It is worth 
reflecting, however, that the same logic that makes nonsense of giv-
ing General Motors the benefit of process38 also makes nonsense of 
the idea of democracy. Why give General Motors a fair trial if its 
guilt is self-evident? Why ask people who ought to be President 
if the answer is indisputable? It is a rather totalitarian world view 
that assumes that "true" public policy can be extracted from the raw 
material of experience, dialectical argument, or a leader's vision 
without some mediating political process. 
31. See text at note 4 supra. 
38. Green generally objects to equating the rights of juridical and biological per-
sons. On the subject of guilty clients, he quotes Austern's question to a law student, 
''Would you represent Sirhan Sirhan?" (p. 279). Green turns this question aside with 
a very dark and difficult argument: "[l]t seems odd to compare Sirhan Sirhan . • • 
with General Motors. The former is alone, impecunious, without political entree, 
and capable of being victimized unless stoutly defended. General Motors has more 
assets than most countries and cannot be similarly outclassed or victimized by a gov-
ernment it can influence in numerous ways" (p. 279). Green does put bis finger, 
of course, on a number of undeniable differences between General Motors and Sirhan 
Sirhan. But surely Austem was aiming at a different point: bow one justifies de-
fending a client one knows to be guilty (or evil). Money has nothing to do with 
that question, unless the argument is that only the poor and lonely are entitled to 
process. I had understood Green's argument hitherto to have been that it is immoral 
to defend bad clients, not rich ones. 
The point about "victimization" is still harder to understand. Sirhan was de-
fended not merely by able counsel but by several famous lawyers through a long, 
costly, and vigorously contested trial. Even so, he was convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death. I have difficulty seeing what further indignity "victimization" could 
have imposed on Sirhan. Sirhan's death sentence was transformed into a life term 
because of the California supreme court's decision in California v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 
3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972). See California v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 
3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973). 
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I do not, however, accuse Green of being totalitarian. He might 
become so if he reasoned some of his premises through to a conclu-
sion, but his allergy to process extends to logic as much as to law. 
He is a demagogue, though, and his unsystematic style hardly ex-
cuses the short shrift he gives to the very serious matters that The 
Other Government should have treated. Instead of accepting the 
challenge of discussing the ethical problems of a law practice at the 
seat of national government, Green just wrote up the notes of his 
legion interviews and turned them adrift in a sea of nonsense. 
What makes his result the more embarrassing is the sound advice 
Green received from H. Thomas Austem. Early in chapter two, 
Green quotes Austem as asking whether Green had read Brandeis 
and Warren's famous 1890 article, "The Right to Privacy" (p. 28). 
No, Green replied. One wishes Green had taken the hint before 
The Other Government went to press. If he had-assuming 
Green's oft-repeated words of praise for Justice- Brandeis39 were 
sincerely meant-he surely would have written a very different 
book. He would, among other things, have attempted to get his 
facts straight, collect his thoughts, marshal his arguments, and ex-
clude from consideration the bratty, gratuitous attacks on other peo-
ple that, I surmise, constitute The Other Government's chief com-
mercial appeal. Brandeis, for one, would have been repulsed by , 
a treatise containing so little discussion of the merits. He and Sam-
uel D. Warren wrote: 
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has 
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. 
To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread 
broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the in-
dolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip . . . . Nor is 
the harm wrought by such invasions confined to the suffering of those 
who may be made the subjects of journalistic or other enterprise. In 
this, as in other branches of commerce, the supply creates the de-
mand. Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the 
seed of more, and, in direct proportion to its circulation, results in a 
lowering of social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparently 
harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. 
It both belittles and perverts . . . . No enthusiasm can flourish, no 
generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence. 40 
These words are eighty-five years old. And they still ring true. 
Daniel D. Polsby 
Legal Adviser to Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson 
Federal Communications Commission 
39. See, e.g., pp. viii, 281, 284. 
40. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890). 
